The Syrian President and UN Policy Makers

Refugees International states:

‘While the Syrian government deserves credit for decades of assistance to hundreds of thou-

sands of Palestinians, and now to the growing number of Iraqi refugees present on their

territory due to the ongoing crisis in Iraq, it must recognize in a concrete way the rights of

hundreds of thousands of individual Kurds within its own borders who have been arbitrarily

denied the right to Syrian nationality. the Syrian government needs to repeal all draconian

restrictions on the free expression of Kurdish cultural identity and grant citizenship to

individuals who lack it.’

[Buried Alive - Stateless Kurds in Syria, Refugees International: Maureen Lynch/Perveen Ali, January 2005]

The conclusions Refugees International made in this 2005 report remain relevant and furthermore they provide a structure by which we can evaluate the UN's own operations in Syria. UNHCR policy-makers need to recognize that their current policy of operation in Syria replicates the exact same position as the Syrian state, which is condemned in UNHCR publications. Both UNHCR and the Syrian government have offered laudable assistance to Palestinians displaced in Syrian camps since 1948. Equally they have provided assistance to Iraqi refugees fleeing sectarian conflict and security threats in Iraq, who are now living integrated within Syrian towns. Yet neither the UN nor the Syrian government have taken any concrete steps to provide a remedy to the 300,000 stateless Kurds within the same territory.

Arab support for Kurdish human rights

Alliance for Kurdish Rights video

For Human Rights need not be conditional. Indeed, many of the arguments used by Arab politicians, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad included, to condemn Israel of mistreatment the Palestinians can be re-applied to criticise Syria's policies and behaviour towards its Kurds.

Striking comparisons can be found in the following areas:
1.  eradication of identity and cultural assimilation (prohibitions on language, change of place names to the dominant language)
2.  settlement building - compare Arab Belt in North East Syria and Israeli settlements
3.  restrictive and conditional citizenship

5 years: No progress

• The UN High Commissioner for Refugees should work alongside the Syrian government to end statelessness in the country, including affected Kurds.
  
  
  Policy Recommendation from Refugees International (2005) 
  Syria: Follow Through on Commitment to Grant Citizenship to Stateless Kurds

'All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.'  
          George Orwell, Animal Farm (1945)

Universal Declaration of Human Rights: absolute universalism or Orwellian universalism?  See 62 years of Human Rights, yet no rights since 62?

62 years of Human Rights, yet no rights since 62

Today marks the 62^nd anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Foundation document of international human rights protection, the UDHR represents a self-proclaimed ‘common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.’ Louise Arbour, former High Commissioner for Human Rights, explained in 2008 that ‘advancing all human rights for all, we will move towards the greatest fulfillment of human potential, a promise which is at the heart of the Universal Declaration.’ Article 2 defines the universal perspective of the provision as ‘without distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.’ The UDHR is the only human rights instrument adopted by all UN member states, and many of its provisions have been further implemented in international law under various conventions and treaties.

Despite this, there are many instances around the world where the theory of non-differentiation is not applied – sometimes by the UN itself. In the case of the stateless Kurds in Syria, the universalism of human rights protection remains purely symbolic. As Jwan Hassan from the mainly Kurdish town of Qamishli in North-East Syria put it, ‘while I might have rights on paper, I have no papers in my name.  Despite being born in Syria to parents born in the territory, having never lived elsewhere, I am not a citizen of this country and have no access to civil rights here.’ While Article 15 of the 1948 Declaration enshrines the universal right to nationality, Jwan goes on to explain how ‘in 1962 I was made a foreigner in Syria, and this was a full 25 years before my birth!’ Indeed the only document the 23 year old possesses (a certificate of non-recognition) records his date of birth, accompanied by the statement ‘did not respond to the Syrian Arab census in the Province of al-Hassake in the year 1962.’

The single-day census in August 1962 was ordained by legislative decree and executed unannounced to the inhabitants of al-Hassake Province. Government justification for this measure was to identify Kurds entering Syria since 1945. In practice, anyone absent on the day, or without all the required paperwork became ‘foreign’ overnight, and anyone who refused to participate was recorded as ‘undocumented’. This highly arbitrary process stripped some 150,000 Kurds of Syrian nationality, and classified siblings, even twins, differently. After almost 50 years the government has provided no remedy and the fact that statelessness can be inherited at birth leaves current estimations at approximately 300,000 stateless Kurds. 

Citizenship, for Hannah Arendt is ‘the right to have rights’, and this is certainly the case in a country like Syria, where presentation of national ID is an integral part of many everyday tasks. As a result, the right to freedom of movement (UDHR, Article 13), property ownership (Art 17), freedom of opinion and expression (Art 19), peaceful assembly and association (Art 20), participation in government (Art 21) as well as many other human rights are severely limited. Furthermore, stateless Kurds find that their peculiar status produces a Catch 22: unable to benefit from ‘the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution’ (Art 13) – as to qualify as a refugee requires leaving one’s country of origin or habitual residence – and at the same time lacking the necessary travel documents to enjoy the ‘right to leave any country, including [their] own’ (Art 12). In recent years the UN has given increased focus to the plight of Internally Displaced Persons, assisting and possibly relocating such individuals. While those who are up-rooted from their home, yet remain in the country, qualify for assistance as IDPs, those who are down-rooted and unable to travel outside their own municipality are – in the case of the Syrian Arab Republic – beyond UN assistance. 

            This is despite Refugee Agency UNHCR’s unique global mandate concerning Statelessness and Stateless Persons. The Agency is a self-professed non-political, humanitarian organization, which – like all UN bodies – functions according to universal principles and without discrimination. However, UNHCR’s operations in Syria are selective, according to the political agenda of the host country. As Syria is neither a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention, nor its 1967 Protocol, a special operating contract was draw up with UNHCR, which effectively restricts the Agency’s work to assisting Arab refugees (mainly from Iraq) and excludes UN intervention in the problems of Kurdish statelessness. 

While the UDHR underlines the clear necessity ‘to promote the development of friendly relations between nations’, it also highlights the duty of ‘every individual and every organ of society’ to secure ‘universal and effective recognition and observance’ of the human rights and freedoms it outlines. Since Syria has not only adopted the UDHR, but has also ratified subsequent legislation (ICCPR/ICESCR), it ought to be held accountable and encouraged to comply with international responsibilities. In practice, however, the Syrian government is being allowed to dictate UN policy. How is ‘every individual’ expected to respect universal human rights when the very organization mandated to do so fails to uphold the principle?

Perhaps the UN ought to review its operating procedure for cases where one of its agencies finds itself faced with a conflict of mandate responsibilities, towards different groups of non-citizens within the same state. This is especially pressing if – as in Syria – the policy produces a situation of differentiated rights according to ethnicity or other discriminatory base. Understandably the UN is committed to assisting the principle host of Iraqi refugee diaspora in a country already supporting the protracted Palestinian refugee situation; yet the cost is clear. Stateless Kurds are victims of political pragmatism, as UN actors become complicit in the Ba’ath Party’s exclusionary Arabist ideology. Although Syria refuses to nationalize stateless Palestinians in order to preserve their eventual ‘right to return’ to the homeland, the state assures broadly the same rights and duties given to Syrian citizens, and UNRWA registered Palestinians can receive identity and travel documents. Stateless Kurds, in contrast, are offered no UN assistance and are deprived of many public services.

In attempting to raise the profile of stateless Kurds in Syria, I in no way wish to damage the valuable work the UN does around the world; on the contrary I aspire to see its core ideology, essentially that embodied in the UDHR, performed to full capacity. Today therefore is indeed a cause for celebration – of the values and promise formally identified 62 years ago. Yet we must not merely cherish the Declaration, but – through constructive criticism and hard work – strive for its universal application.

“New” nationalism in the Middle East

Inhabitants of one Aleppian
street display their teams' colours

For another year, the World Cup looks to be dominated by the teams of Europe and South America.  However, while Argentina, Brazil and Spain are favourites to win this year’s competition, its African hosts are keen to remind us that this is anything but a two-continent competition.  As the organizers work hard to insert some local flavour into the competition proceedings, it is important not to underestimate the strength of the global spectatorship, extending far beyond simply the territories of competing countries.

            Despite its limited representation (Algeria being the region’s only qualifying country), the Middle East is excitedly observing the start of the competition.  With every qualifying game having been followed closely by crowds of people in cafés, restaurants and homes, few spectators remain neutral.  Like the almost obligatory preference for one of Barcelona or Real Madrid in the Spanish League, selecting a country to support is a serious matter in the Middle East.

In the cities of Syria, flags hang from houses and cars to mark an individual’s chosen team.  Multiple flags on the same apartment are testament to the often-divided loyalties within a single family.  Various factors may inform an individual’s choice of team.  Some supporters have family (or other personal) connections to the country they follow; others admire the values and culture of a certain country.  And of course there are those whose decision is motivated by athletic evaluation alone.  The World Cup season consequently generates a more open and interesting debate in Syria than in many countries where place of birth acts as the logical pre-determiner of team affiliation. 

            By and large, Syrian support reflects the predicted favourites in the competition, with an inflated fan-base for Algeria – presumably resulting from the Arab and Muslim national character it shares with Syria.  The selection of one’s team, and subsequent display of its colours, provides an opportunity to express personal preference within the prism of Syrian national identity.  This phenomenon of foreign nationalism is little acknowledged in work on the Middle East, where society is often characterized as hermetic and closed to the wider world.

While any challenge to the integrity of Syria’s Arab Republic may be considered anti-constitutional, the current “World Cup nationalism” is tolerated by the state and presents an opportunity for legitimate identity construction (permissible) within the Republican framework.  Mohammad Hussein, an employee in an Aleppo factory, articulates the lack of conflict and compromise involved in following the World Cup as a Syrian national: ‘My country is Syria, my favourite club is Manchester Utd and my team in the World Cup is Italy.  Not until the day that these three must play against one another shall I see any contradiction in the pride I have for each of them.’ 

The apparent compatibility of Syrian Republican loyalty with support for the big teams and personalities of international football is further underlined by the incongruous placement of the Syrian national – not to mention Barcelona - flag in the line-up below.  Likewise, the foreign flags that temporarily accompany the ubiquitous images of the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, on cars windows throughout the capital need not fundamentally challenge the concept of collective Syrian identity, but rather is an impetus to transform it according to popular sentiment. 

Juxtaposed identities: The Syrian Arab Republic flag 

hangs among those of the World Cup favourites. 

For World Cup fever in Syria is perhaps nothing new.  As Abu Jalal, a now retired shop-keeper from Homs recalls, there has always been a strong interest in what is happening beyond the national borders: ‘I remember watching the games on television with my father in 1962.’  What has changed, however, is the way people follow the competition.  ‘Back then’ continues Abu Jalal, ‘anyone could watch the games, but now you need to pay money for a private television licence.’  In addition to this, recent developments in Internet and mobile phone technology have revolutionized World Cup spectatorship.

Yet the most observable change in this year's World Cup is the visibility with which fans are expressing their support.  The patchwork of international flags flying in Syrian cities signifies a diversification in the homogenous state-imposed identity.  This ‘multiculturalism on the ground’ encourages the development of new ideas and less inward attitudes.  Both state and minorities within may harness these "new" national ideologies to further their own agendas.

For the multi-ethnic, religiously divided state that sees itself as a single unit, support for distant nations represents a non-confrontational expression of internal difference.  While team loyalty within Syrian sport is often strongly motivated by the religious and cultural identity-bases of local clubs, identification with World Cup nations is able to usefully transcend the fault-lines that traditionally complicate a unified Syrian identity.

Also, for the minorities whose cultural self-expression may be curtailed by the monolithic identity of Syrian Arab Republicanism, World Cup nationalism can provide an alternative expression.  Many Kurds in Syria, for example, choose to support Germany – the principal host of Kurdish diaspora in Europe.  This allegiance is both a sign of gratitude for the hospitability of the German state, and a proxy for expression of their own ethnic identity.  While display of the traditional Kurdish colours in Syria could elicit serious consequences, the hanging of a German flag is – for Kurds – an indirect, and therefore permissible, form of identity assertion.  As the Kurds represent an indigenous group of significant numbers, their nationalism is seen as a direct challenge to the Syrian state.  An identity compromise with Germany, however, is derived from the legitimate and politically safe expression of external nationalism.

            The World Cup in Syria shows how local identity is – in increasingly more conscious ways – influenced by an awareness of the wider world.  At least in football, therefore, Syrians have proven themselves to be fervent multiculturalists. It is now the turn of their political representatives to reform internal policy accordingly and re-engage foreign relations to close the saga of Syria’s international isolation.